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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Man-made disasters and the design role 
Human errors or human-related factors have been 
regarded as significant contributors or even the trig-
gering element of recent major accidents, according 
to a number of technical investigations designated to 
determine the causes of these adverse events. Fuku-
shima in Japan and Macondo in the Gulf of Mexico 
are examples, to name but a few, of catastrophic 
events deeply associated with direct human actions 
or flawed decision-making processes leading to dev-
astating consequences. Kurokawa et al (2012), for 
example, concluded that the 2011 nuclear accident in 
Japan was a man-made disaster, a term coined al-
most 40 years ago by Turner (1978) to emphasise 
how information distortion generated by systems 
complexity can challenge risk prevention measures.  
To describe the dynamics of accident causation, in 
his well-known “Swiss cheese” theory, Reason 
(1990) introduced the idea of a sequence of safety 
barriers (represented by cheese slices) with holes as 
an indication of flaws. Complex systems fail and ac-
cidents occur when a combination of synchronized 
flaws in these barriers take place or, better saying, as 
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a result of the alignment of the holes in the Swiss 
cheese slices. He also associated these flaws/holes to 
slips, lapses, mistakes, violations (or active failures) 
and latent conditions (Reason, 1997). Thus, it is 
widely accepted that high-technology accidents are 
likely to occur under a complex interaction of multi-
ple active failures and latent conditions. These latent 
conditions might have long incubation periods, im-
plying that a number of design failures may be em-
bedded in systems until combined with human errors 
and exposed in an accident sequence.  
Previous data analysis (Moura et al, 2015a) using 
a proprietary dataset structured to capture human, 
technology and organisational features from indus-
trial accidents (Multi-attribute Technological Acci-
dents Dataset - MATA-D), found that more than 
60% of the events in the dataset featured some sort 
of design failure, which can be considered to be the 
most frequent single contributory factor (or latent 
condition) to major accidents. Consequently, the de-
tection and correction of design gaps in earlier stages 
of the facilities’ lifecycle, when the cost of correc-
tions is significantly lower, would certainly reduce 
the likelihood of undesirable outcomes during the 
operational phase. However, traditional hazard iden-
tification methods used in design such as Fault-trees 
or FMECAs (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality 
Analysis), in spite of being very successful in dis-
closing undesirable conditions (Vesely et al, 1981), 
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have some limitations that might be preventing the 
recognition of multidimensional factors leading to a 
critical accident. These limitations can arise from 
their structure (one rigid/hierarchical, the other de-
pendent on the accurate prediction of all failure 
modes) or from difficulties in encompassing simul-
taneous failures involving humans and organisations. 
In fact, industrial accidents investigations attest that 
seemingly autonomous features typically found in 
industrial environments can be combined and syn-
chronised in an apparently unpredictable fashion to 
produce critical accidents. 
This exposes the need for a novel method focused 
on the examination of specific interactions between 
latent design deficiencies and human erroneous ac-
tions, assuming that the identification of common 
patterns from real-world accidents can provide some 
guidance to design failure prevention schemes. Limi-
tations in dealing with complex data will be over-
come by the application of the self-organising maps 
(SOM) algorithm developed by Kohonen (2001) in a 
major-accidents dataset, followed by the detailed in-
terpretation of the output with regard to design fail-
ures. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 The Multi-Attribute Technological 
Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) 
In order to capture human, technology and organisa-
tional features from industrial accidents, the authors 
developed a comprehensive dataset by collecting da-
ta from insurance companies, regulators, industry 
and official commissions designated to investigate 
major accidents.  The proposed dataset structure fol-
lowed Hollnagel’s (1998) Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method (CREAM) taxonomy, and 
was used in this work to identify and classify events 
from different industrial domains under a common 
framework. As major accidents can be considered to 
be rare events, having the possibility to merge a 
number of significant events generated from seem-
ingly dissimilar industrial segments, such as aviation 
and chemicals factories, would build-up sufficient 
data to allow statistical analysis and disclose com-
mon associations. This novel approach might prove 
to be a powerful alternative to understand how latent 
conditions embedded in design are interacting with 
human errors to generate or contribute to major ac-
cidents.     
In summary, features related to (i) human errone-
ous actions (e.g. timing, omission, wrong direction, 
wrong object, wrong sequence); (ii) human cognitive 
functions (e.g. observation missed, wrong identifica-
tion, decision error, wrong reasoning, incorrect pre-
diction, inadequate plan, priority error); (iii) tempo-
rary person-related functions (e.g. fear, fatigue, dis-
traction); (iv) permanent person-related functions 
(e.g. functional impairment); (v) technology (e.g. 
equipment failure, inadequate procedure, software 
fault); and (vi) organisation (e.g. communication, 
maintenance failure, quality control, design failure, 
inadequate task allocation, training, working condi-
tions) are extracted from the accident reports and or-
ganised in a matrix in order to allow numerical anal-
ysis (using binary tables containing the presence or 
absence of attributes). Each accident can simultane-
ously contain up to 53 of these human, technology 
and organisational factors. Detailed evaluations and 
further interpretation are also possible, by using the 
brief descriptions containing the hot spots of each 
one of the identified factors, as interpreted from the 
accident reports. Moura et al (2015a) presented a full 
account of the proposed classification scheme and a 
detailed example of an accident dissection. 
Currently, the dataset contains 216 accidents from 
several industrial domains (e.g. refining, upstream 
(oil & gas), terminals and distribution, petrochemi-
cals, construction, metallurgy, nuclear and gas pro-
cessing and chemicals). 
3 DATASET ANALYSIS METHOD 
3.1 Clustering and data mining using self-
organisation   
Aiming at the identification of groups of major in-
dustrial accidents sharing common features, an un-
supervised training neural network technique named 
Self-organising Maps (Kohonen, 2001), was applied 
to the MATA-D dataset. The resulting self-
organisation summarises the multidimensional data 
(a 216 x 53 Matrix, in the current study) in a two-
dimensional topographic map (Figure 1), where ac-
cidents were mutually attracted by a similarity crite-
ria and thus adjacently grouped. 2-D SOM maps 
were created with Viscovery® SOMine expert ver-
sion.  
Figure 1 clearly shows five distinct regions as a re-
sult of the application of the SOM algorithm, mean-
ing that similar accidents were connected by five dif-
ferent basic settings. A comprehensive description of 
the SOM algorithm and the main features of the re-
sulting five clusters were extensively discussed by 
Moura et al (2015b), and this work will provide a 
step forward by focusing on the identification and in-
terpretation of the features specifically related to the 
Design Failure factor, which highest incidences were 
observed in Clusters 1 and 4, respectively. Results 
will reveal gaps and provide further insight into the 
design weaknesses which may be contributing to the 
perpetuation of human errors. 
Figure 1. SOM Clustering for MATA-D, after Moura et al 
(2015b) 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Design Failure Clustering results 
The Design Failure factor highest incidences were 
shown in Clusters 1 and 4, with 86.0% and 83.3%, 
respectively. Therefore, once the self-organising 
maps algorithm had been used to highlight these two 
groups as the most important from a design perspec-
tive, further analysis on the individual features’ 
SOM maps will be conducted in order to disclose 
relevant associations. Table 1 presents the overall 
importance of each human (from Wrong Time to 
Cognitive Bias), technology (from Equipment Fail-
ure to Mislabelling) and Organizational (from 
Communication Failure to Inadequate Working 
Hours) feature for the full dataset, compared to the 
results of the SOM algorithm for clusters 1 and 4. 
For instance, it can be seen that the Design Failure 
factor frequency has shown an increase of 23.5% for 
cluster 1 and of 20.8% in cluster 4, above the overall 
incidence of 62.5%. 
 
Table 1. MATA-D Overall Frequencies vs. SOM 
clusters 1 & 4 frequencies  
Factor Overall Cluster 1 
Var. 
(C1-T) 
Cluster 
4 
Var. 
(C4-T) 
Wrong Time 14.8% 38.0% 23.2% 2.8% -12.0% 
Wrong Type 13.0% 26.0% 13.0% 8.3% -4.6% 
Wrong Object 2.3% 2.0% -0.3% 5.6% 3.2% 
Wrong Place 26.9% 6.0% -20.9% 52.8% 25.9% 
Obs. Missed 15.3% 26.0% 10.7% 0.0% -15.3% 
False Observ. 2.3% 0.0% -2.3% 2.8% 0.5% 
Wrong Id. 2.8% 2.0% -0.8% 5.6% 2.8% 
Diagnosis 13.0% 16.0% 3.0% 11.1% -1.9% 
Reasoning 12.0% 20.0% 8.0% 27.8% 15.7% 
Decision error 8.8% 12.0% 3.2% 2.8% -6.0% 
Interp. Delay 5.1% 8.0% 2.9% 5.6% 0.5% 
Incor. Predict. 3.7% 6.0% 2.3% 11.1% 7.4% 
Inad. Plan 9.7% 16.0% 6.3% 2.8% -6.9% 
Priority error 6.9% 14.0% 7.1% 2.8% -4.2% 
Memory fail 0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 
Fear 2.3% 2.0% -0.3% 0.0% -2.3% 
Distraction 6.5% 4.0% -2.5% 2.8% -3.7% 
Fatigue 3.2% 4.0% 0.8% 2.8% -0.5% 
Perf. var. 1.4% 0.0% -1.4% 0.0% -1.4% 
Inattention 2.3% 2.0% -0.3% 0.0% -2.3% 
Physio. stress 0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 2.8% 1.9% 
Psycho. stress 3.2% 2.0% -1.2% 5.6% 2.3% 
Func. Impair. 0.5% 2.0% 1.5% 0.0% -0.5% 
Cognitive styl 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Cognitive bias 6.9% 10.0% 3.1% 8.3% 1.4% 
Equip failure 57.9% 82.0% 24.1% 61.1% 3.2% 
Software fault 2.8% 0.0% -2.8% 5.6% 2.8% 
Inadeq. proc. 43.1% 44.0% 0.9% 77.8% 34.7% 
Access limits 1.4% 0.0% -1.4% 2.8% 1.4% 
Ambig. Info. 2.8% 6.0% 3.2% 2.8% 0.0% 
Incomp. info. 13.9% 20.0% 6.1% 16.7% 2.8% 
Access probs 1.4% 2.0% 0.6% 5.6% 4.2% 
Mislabelling 1.4% 0.0% -1.4% 2.8% 1.4% 
Communic. 11.1% 26.0% 14.9% 5.6% -5.6% 
Missing info. 19.0% 20.0% 1.0% 58.3% 39.4% 
Maintenance 34.7% 42.0% 7.3% 83.3% 48.6% 
Quality Ctrl. 57.4% 82.0% 24.6% 97.2% 39.8% 
Management  10.2% 18.0% 7.8% 19.4% 9.3% 
Design  62.5% 86.0% 23.5% 83.3% 20.8% 
Task alloc. 56.5% 62.0% 5.5% 97.2% 40.7% 
Social press. 6.9% 0.0% -6.9% 22.2% 15.3% 
Skills 36.6% 72.0% 35.4% 36.1% -0.5% 
Knowledge 33.3% 60.0% 26.7% 63.9% 30.6% 
Temperature 1.4% 2.0% 0.6% 0.0% -1.4% 
Sound 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Humidity 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Illumination 0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 5.6% 4.6% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ambient cond 7.4% 4.0% -3.4% 5.6% -1.9% 
Demand 5.6% 2.0% -3.6% 5.6% 0.0% 
Layout 2.8% 2.0% -0.8% 2.8% 0.0% 
Team support 3.7% 4.0% 0.3% 5.6% 1.9% 
Working hrs 4.2% 2.0% -2.2% 5.6% 1.4% 
 
Factors which presented a positive variation of more 
than 10% in relation to the overall frequency are in 
bold. These figures highlight which human, technol-
ogy and organisational features were most attracted 
to a specific cluster at the topological map depicted 
in Figure 1, clearly differentiating the significant fea-
tures of accidents particularly associated with design 
failures. Three factors have shown a substantial in-
crease in both analysed clusters: Design Failure, In-
adequate Quality Control and Insufficient 
Knowledge. Another important finding observed 
from the enhanced analysis of the resulting cluster-
ing is that 58% of the accidents in cluster one shared 
a simultaneous trio of factors in the origin of the 
events: Design Failure, Inadequate Quality Control 
and Equipment Failure, while 81% of the Cluster 4’s 
events contained in their core the Design Failure, In-
adequate Quality Control and Inadequate Task Allo-
cation factors. These numbers indicate a well-
defined path for further investigation, as the genesis 
of major accidents involving design failures appears 
to be grounded on a very limited amount of factors.  
Cluster 1 accidents, which were deeply associated 
with the Design Failure, Inadequate Quality Control 
and Equipment Failure factors, were largely accom-
panied by two very specific human erroneous ac-
tions, Wrong Time and Wrong Type. In this group-
ing, these human errors were uniformly connected 
with all three cognitive levels (Observation, Interpre-
tation and Planning), but with an observable greater 
tie between the Wrong Time and Observation 
Missed factors, as exemplified in Figures 2 and 3.  
The SOM maps for individual features (Figures 2 
to 6) are binary, meaning that the dark grey zone is 
where the analysed item was absent, while the light 
grey represents the regions were the feature was ob-
served.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Observation missed SOM 
 
Further analysis of the Wrong Time SOM also al-
lows identifying that in the scarce cases where De-
sign Failure did not seem to contribute to the acci-
dents, an Insufficient Skills issue (i.e. lack of 
practical experience or equipment mishandling) was 
manifested and joined the Inadequate Quality Con-
trol and Equipment Failure factors to contribute to 
the undesirable outcome. When Inadequate Quality 
Control or Equipment Failure did not appear to di-
rectly contribute to the accident (highlighted regions 
on Figure 4), the Wrong Time feature was equally 
represented, but combined with the Insufficient 
Knowledge factor (e.g. lack of understanding of the 
situation).
 
Figure 2. Wrong Time SOM 
 
Table 2. Cluster 1 accident examples 
Design Failure Observation Interpretation / Planning Erroneous action 
Safety Valve was not de-
signed to be next to the 
protected pump, so re-
moval identification was 
not visually possible from 
pump room. 
Operator overlooked 
cue/signal, by not realis-
ing that the safety valve 
was out for maintenance 
when inspecting pump. 
Faulty diagnosis about pump opera-
tional state (valve had been removed 
for maintenance but the crew started 
the pump after visual inspection). 
Timing, too early: operator 
started pump before it has been 
cleared by maintenance. 
Due to design and manu-
facture failure, check 
valve broke (internal pin) 
upon pneumatic closure 
and allowed flux. 
 
No flammable gas detec-
tion alarm. 
Valve position was not 
checked after system trip. 
Gas compression system 
flow variations (immedi-
ate increase followed by 
gradual drop) were not 
seen by operator during 
restart attempts. 
Wrong Priorities: without a clear in-
dication of a serious problem (no de-
tection alarm), foreman focused on 
restarting the system as soon as pos-
sible to reduce lost resources (flaring 
of uncompressed gases), after a pow-
er loss. 
 
Timing, too early: Operator 
tried to restart gas compression 
system before full electrical 
power had been restored, caus-
ing the system to trip (and the 
valves to slam shut) many times. 
Pump design allowed up-
side-down plate fitting. 
Critical alarm was not au-
dible (only visual). 
Plant alarm signals were 
overlooked. 
Indirect indications of pump stop-
page appeared to be misinterpreted 
by process operators. 
Wrong direction/type: Clamping 
plate was fitted upside down 
thus fixing bolds were misa-
ligned. 
Table 2 highlights some MATA-D extracts of cluster 
1-type accidents, focusing on the interaction between 
design failures; observation, interpretation and plan-  
ning cognitive functions; and Wrong Time/Wrong 
Type erroneous actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Insufficient Knowledge SOM 
 
Apart from the situations where the simultaneous 
failure of the threesome Design-Quality Control-
Equipment was present, the Wrong Type factor in 
cluster one only persisted in the few cases where a 
Wrong Reasoning cognitive function was also 
shown (shadowed regions on Figures 5 and 6). It 
means that even when one of the three main factors 
was not decisive, a faulty reasoning involving infer-
ences, generalisations or deduction was still capable 
of leading to an erroneous action and contribute to 
an accident. Similarly to the Wrong Time factor, er-
roneous actions classified as Wrong Type also per-
sisted when the Design Failure was not critical, but 
only when combined with Insufficient Skills. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Wrong Reasoning SOM 
 
In Cluster 4, accidents were largely based on the trio 
Design-Quality-Task Allocation, all organisational 
features. The manifestation of human erroneous ac-
tions was heavily determined by the Wrong Place 
feature, accompanied by a specific interpretation 
cognitive function, the Wrong Reasoning factor. 
Contrasting with Cluster 1, where other factors (e.g. 
Insufficient Skills) joined some erroneous actions to 
produce an accident sequence even in the absence of 
a design flaw, no observable single feature could 
substitute the Design Failure and direct link with the 
Wrong Place in this cluster. Additionally, 100% of 
the Wrong Place appearances were simultaneously 
influenced by Inadequate Task Allocation and Inad-
equate Quality Control.  
Table 3 exemplifies the nature of accidents 
grouped in Cluster 4. Design Failures are combined 
with interpretation cognitive functions to stimulate a 
Wrong Place erroneous action type. In these cases, 
the number of cognitive functions associated to ob-
servation and planning was negligible.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Wrong Type SOM 
Table 3. Cluster 4 accident examples 
Design Failure Observation Interpretation Erroneous Action 
Design of the pipe trench al-
lowed hot water/solids to 
stay in permanent contact 
with hydrogen pipe. 
- 
A recent leak in a non-related nitro-
gen pipe in the plant made induced 
operator to think that the new leakage 
was similar. (Wrong Reasoning) 
Sequence, Jump forward: mainte-
nance skipped testing and continued 
service without knowing the liquid 
identification. (Wrong Place) 
Poor design of oven temper-
ature controller. 
- 
Operator interpreted the temperature 
problem as a product quality issue 
and ignored the safety critical matter 
of letting the furnace doors open. 
(wrong reasoning, wrong priorities) 
Wrong action: operator opened fur-
nace doors to control temperature as 
it was too high. (Wrong Place) 
 
 
No Equipment 
Failure 
No Inadequate 
Quality Control 
No Equip-
ment Failure  
 
No Inadequate 
Quality Control 
No Design 
Failure 
 
No Equip-
ment Failure  
 
No Inadequate 
Quality Control 
No Design 
Failure 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Genesis of human errors in major accidents   
The Design Failure feature was the most significant 
single contributor to major accidents, and obtained 
the highest frequency in the MATA-D dataset. En-
hanced analysis applying the self-organisation algo-
rithm for clustering/data mining purposes highlight-
ed the two areas in which design failures imposed its 
greatest influence: Cluster 1 and Cluster 4. In spite 
of being composed of a complex interaction of up to 
53 features, the examination of the clustering and of 
the self-organising maps for each individual feature 
indicated that the major accidents origins in these 
two areas seem to lie on a straightforward and nar-
row basis to trigger disturbances in cognitive func-
tions. As a direct result, the manifestation of very 
specific human erroneous actions in the end of the 
accident sequence was recognised. Design Failure 
and Inadequate Quality Control were combined with 
Equipment Failure to trigger Wrong Time and 
Wrong place erroneous actions in Cluster 1, and 
with Inadequate Task Allocation to trigger the 
Wrong Place error mode in Cluster 4. Despite the 
differences between Cluster 1 and Cluster 4, the in-
put-output connection depicted in Figure 7 is largely 
applicable, and thus can be depicted as a general pat-
tern for major accidents related to design failures 
and human errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: General configuration of human errors in industrial 
accidents 
 
This model suggests that approaches which intend to 
prevent human error in design by simply reacting to 
large sets of possible human erroneous actions can 
be largely unsatisfactory and of limited usage, as the 
phenomenon focus is fundamentally wrong. Human 
errors can be mistakenly seen as the cause of major 
accidents, but the data analysis indicates that they are 
mainly responses to unsupportive inputs (e.g. Design 
Failure) which misdirected human mental processes. 
From a design perspective, the correct and precise 
approach would necessarily involve designing to 
support mental processes and facilitate the fluidity of 
the human cognitive functions. 
When latent conditions embedded in design are 
not observable in an accident sequence, basic poor 
training circumstances (lack of skills) play a more 
significant role to contribute to accidents, but this 
training-related input is expected to be dealt with in 
future stages of the lifecycle, specifically in the op-
erational stage. Nevertheless, as can be concluded 
from the Insufficient Knowledge SOM map (Figure 
4) analysis, a poor design appears to override the 
knowledge about the system, and, to compensate the 
design deficiency, the human operator has to per-
form a complex cognition sequence, involving the 
observation of simultaneous clues and signals, tak-
ing immediate decisions based on interpretations and 
construct accurate mental plans. It is worth noticing 
that overlooking a cue, indication or measurement 
(observation missed) is particularly associated with 
the Wrong Time factor, as previously seen in Figures 
2 and 3. 
5.2 Design transparency and comprehension   
The analysis of the results in Cluster 1 and the 
examples in Table 2 shows a clear path for improv-
ing design. The strong presence of the Observation 
Missed cognitive function exposes an issue that can 
be defined as “transparency of design”. At first 
glance, errors such as starting a pump under mainte-
nance and clamping a plate fitting upside-down can 
be considered to be elementary, but the broad view is 
that design obscurity (safety valve was located away 
from the equipment, design allowed an upside-down 
fitting and the lack of audible alarms) caused a sys-
tem ambiguity difficult to interpret in the face of 
simultaneous operating challenges. 
In Cluster 4, the design input mostly contributed 
to a more complex, but well-defined, flawed mental 
modelling. The Wrong Reasoning feature was mani-
fested while the human operator was trying to carry 
out a sequence of actions (Wrong Place) to compen-
sate (or as a consequence) of the Design Failure. 
Once again, an isolated analysis of the human errors 
such as opening the furnace doors to control temper-
ature can appear to be inconsequential, but, in fact, 
an undoubtedly poor design triggered interpretation 
shortcomings. In these cases, the overall understand-
ing of the system behaviour was lost. 
Input 
- Design Failure (C1 & C4) 
- Inadequate Quality Control (C1 & C4) 
- Equipment Failure (C1) 
- Inadequate Task Allocation (C4) 
 
 
Cognitive Functions (Processing) 
- Observation (C1) 
- Interpretation (C1 & C4) 
- Planning (C1) 
Output (erroneous actions) 
- Wrong Time (C1) 
- Wrong Type (C1) 
- Wrong Place (C4) 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 A new two-step approach to design 
It is now clear that the early detection of latent 
conditions embedded in design is essential to mini-
mise human errors and thus accidents, and the gen-
eral configuration in Figure 7 aims to express a di-
rect and useful path to support design failure 
prevention schemes. Significant improvement can be 
achieved by primarily focusing on the “transparency 
of design”, which means to initiate the design analy-
sis from a visibility assessment perspective - the sys-
tem variables and components which are simultane-
ously seen by operators and serve as input to the 
decision-making process (largely based on cognitive 
functions). This study has also shown that the person 
in charge might perform an irregular sequence of ac-
tions to keep the system under control, and an incor-
rect reasoning under this environment is usually dis-
astrous. Thus, the second step would involve the 
analysis of how design might support the accurate 
interpretation of system status and help the operator 
in the search for alternative solutions for operations’ 
continuity. This would lead to a broad “comprehen-
sion of design”. 
Therefore, from the real-world accidents dataset 
scrutinised in this study, it can be concluded that de-
signing for transparency and human comprehension 
can be a prevailing mechanism to transform design 
in the future and reduce major accidents in high-
technology industries. 
6.2 Future Developments 
Future investigation regarding the mental processes 
depicted in Figure 7 may perhaps give some insight 
into how design and organisational aspects can stim-
ulate an improved interpretation and systemic ap-
proach to operational reality. Also, the high frequen-
cy of the quality control and maintenance failure 
features in Cluster 4 may deserve further examina-
tion.  
A complete analysis of the MATA-D design fail-
ures description in relation to cognitive functions 
failures may also support the construction of a 
straightforward list of critical interactions to be 
checked during the design stage. 
Existing design can benefit from the same method 
to scrutinise relevant factors such as training and 
quality control. Similarly, other clusters could be ex-
amined in the search for additional input to design 
improvement strategies.         
The expansion of the data sample to include more 
high-technology accidents is also ongoing. 
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